He did say practically nobody, I think:)
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Please calm down.
Lots of enterprise Unix sysadmins, say that ACL is much more powerful than ordinary Unix read/right control. There are cases when you need ACL, and when 888 does not cut it.
Regarding ext3, it does not really protect your data well. SMART does not help. ext3 and NTFS are equally bad (or good) in protecting your data:
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/storage/ho...ta-at-risk/169
"Dr. Prabhakaran found that ALL the file systems [NTFS, ext3, ReiserFS, JFS and XFS] shared
. . . ad hoc failure handling and a great deal of illogical inconsistency in failure policy . . . such inconsistency leads to substantially different detection and recovery strategies under similar fault scenarios, resulting in unpredictable and often undesirable fault-handling strategies.
. . .
We observe little tolerance to transient failures; . . . . none of the file systems can recover from partial disk failures, due to a lack of in-disk redundancy.
In a nutshell he found that the all the file systems have
. . . failure policies that are often inconsistent, sometimes buggy, and generally inadequate in their ability to recover from partial disk failures. "
To make a long story short.
My data on NTFS is just as safe as my data on ext4.
By the way, my disk works OK and I do have backups.
You're still giving the same:
I'm not interested in trojan horses or something which tries to guess users passwords. Nothing stops people from making thousands of trojan horses for Linux, but the problem with the trojan horses is, you have to execute them somehow. On Windows it was enough to connect to the internet or LAN to get a virus. I don't know how something like this can have a place (maybe broken design, some bug...).Quote:
Uses multiple strategies for exploitation, including brute-force username and password combinations
That article was from 2007, as was the research paper it was based on. The research paper looked at flaws that could compromise security in filesystems at the time, including filesystems like NTFS, XFS, and EXT3 amongst many others. The author then went on to propose a way to improve the EXT3 filesystem specifically so it could avoid these risks. As best as I can tell these improvements were incorporated into the EXT4 filesystem. In fact it seems the improvements were implemented in EXT4 almost immediately, since a talk about then-upcomming EXT4 a few months later discusses the improvements.
So rather than showing that all filesystems are equal, the article actually suggests that the EXT4 filesystem is superior in terms of data security (unless NTFS also implemented those features, which it might have).
I meant 2007, not 1997 of course. I'm still not used to this whole "new millenium" thing.
That PhD thesis (not research paper) looked at only some flaws. It did not do a full check (which would be equivalent of proving mathematically that there are no flaws which is impossible to do today).
So, fine, some flaws might have been corrected in ext4, but if you read the PhD thesis (which I have) you will see that only some flaws are corrected. Not everyone.
And besides, hardware raid also has lots of flaws and is not safe either. Probably you knew that as well:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAID#Problems_with_RAID
In other words, I would not trust on NTFS nor ext4. There is no research on ext4 as I know of, but that does not prove that ext4 is safe.
I tolerate only those who tolerate.
Several dozens of universities (thats tens of thousands workstations and slim clients) in Germany used SunOS Solaris with completely standard 888. In case one needs runtime checks - there are selinux and apparmor. I have no idea who uses ACLs, but if it exists - its needed, maybe by some rare huge research institutes with complex group access collisions.
It does, in full journaling and. in case of ext4, with barriers on, it does. At least at logical level - till physical layer. For physical layer there is SMART paired with backups.
I wonder why would they build it in? Self Monitoring and Analysis. I only need Reallocated Sector count and Spindle Start Retries to cover it all.
If course, FS "could" additinally CRC the data, but thats what happens if you add encryption system on top. Encryption system on Windows - fail, whole internet of users who had system failures (even minimal) lead to inconsistency and complete data loss due to inability to decrypt it back.
Nice, real-life cases vs indian random word-spucking "professor". He should open a bug if he finds something. Failure policy is irrelevant to file system. Failure policy is multistep logic to deal with failures at many levels. FS in only small part and deals only and only with file consistency at load or failures. It CAN be part of failure policy, but it only if YOU build it. The whole heap of text is useless - you set bash script to check smart on drives before mounting(initramfs, init) and you have failure policy. Anyways, if ext detects incorrect shutdown - it recovers journal or rechecks the FS. If detects serious errors, it remounts system as RO. How is this "inconsistent"?
Yes, it is specific to RAID itself and how its hooked up. Mirror unsync's are not uncommon on garbage cheap chipsets (dawicontrol and similar idiots).
It is not relevant of FS, it does not make ext any less secure.
But if you happen to trust ntfs any more than ext, oh my - well, its your personal choice :))