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Originally Posted by Qaridarium
if you are happy you can make a p2p Cluster of linux users and bruteforce the 256bit aes key...
"The resources required for a brute force attack scale exponentially with increasing key size, not linearly. As a result, doubling the key size for an algorithm does not simply double the required number of operations, but rather squares them." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_force_attack
(Someone check if I make a mistake in the following)
Let's say the amount of transistors in year 0 is k. The amount in year 2 by Moore's law would be 2^1 * k. Original effort required to break the encryption is p. Effort after increasing p by one is p^2. If we assumed the password was crackable with transistors k, then p = k. Let's say i is the amount of two year cycles it takes to catch up after a single increment in password size. 2^i * k = k^2 (divided by k) => 2^i = k <=> i = log2(k). You quickly notice from that that you can't indefinitely keep up with the password length increases. Like if it took a two-billion-transistor CPU to break a password with length n, it would take 61.794705708 years by my calculations before you could create a computer that could break a password with length n+1.
Last edited by nanonyme; 04-22-2009 at 11:35 AM.

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Originally Posted by nanonyme
The extensions I know of that are related to this are generic ones that you get with fglrx and will get later (as in, soon enough) get with open drivers and have nothing at all to do with nVidia except that nVidia has implemented them in a quite stable fashion.
its a hartware problem! up to R580 there is no way!

first R600 can handle this!

and yes Future Catalyst versions and wine version will bring support for this shit.

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Originally Posted by nanonyme
"The resources required for a brute force attack scale exponentially with increasing key size, not linearly. As a result, doubling the key size for an algorithm does not simply double the required number of operations, but rather squares them." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_force_attack
(Someone check if I make a mistake in the following)
Let's say the amount of transistors in year 0 is k. The amount in year 2 by Moore's law would be 2^1 * k. Original effort required to break the encryption is p. Effort after increasing p by one is p^2. If we assumed the password was crackable with transistors k, then p = k. Let's say i is the amount of two year cycles it takes to catch up after a single increment in password size. 2^i * k = k^2 (divided by k) => 2^i = k <=> i = log2(k). You quickly notice from that that you can't indefinitely keep up with the password length increases. Like if it took a two-billion-transistor CPU to break a password with length n, it would take 61.794705708 years by my calculations before you could create a computer that could break a password with length n+1.
the Point is the error of this copy protection is not the AES key ,,,

and yes 256bit AES key is not to much to brude force them..

not for 1 pc or 1 server but in a P2P network all over the world Millon of Servers/PCs can Crack this shit..

AES is not an opensource s Krypto algiritmus someone can find a bug so its posible to fragment a big KEy into a little one.

in german wikipedia:
"Kurz vor der Bekanntgabe des AES-Wettbewerbs stellten verschiedene Autoren eine einfache algebraische Darstellung von AES als Kettenbruch vor. Dies könnte für erfolgreiche Angriffe genutzt werden. Hierzu gibt es einen Videovortrag von Niels Ferguson auf der HAL 2001 [3].
2002 wurde von Courtois and Pieprzyk ein theoretischer Angriff namens XSL gegen Serpent und Rijndael vorgestellt (siehe Serpent).
Im Mai 2005 veröffentlichte Daniel Bernstein einen Artikel (PDF-Version) über eine unerwartet einfache Timing-Attacke (eine Art der Seitenkanalattacke) auf den Advanced Encryption Standard."

in simple worts... big key Goes to a Little and brudeforce will be easy!

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NIST sums it up nicely, even at 128 bit

People 7.00E+09
Computers per person 10.00
Computers 1.00E+09
Combos per second per computer 7.00E+19
Total combos per second 7.00E+19
Seconds per year 3.15E+07
Total combos per year 2.22E+12
128-bit key combos (*50%) 1.70E+38
Years to crack 7.66E+25

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Originally Posted by Qaridarium
PCGH in germany shows that ATI render shadows korrekt @ crysis and nvidia save shader power and do not render all shadows!

And so? I just provided you with proof that that type of thing is not limited to nvidia but is rampant among all cards. Hell don't even mix intel and s3 renders into it, they are even worse.

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Originally Posted by Kano
Did you see any UVD2 (libamdxvba1) programming examples? I never saw those, but I use VDPAU since serveral month. Currently my CPUs are so fast that I don't need VDPAU anymore on the systems which would support it (Intel Q9300@3GHz or E8400), but before 1080p was really much better with it. AMD waits so long that they could sell cpus instead of gpus as well. After 1-2 years nobody will need h264 accelleration when the minium speed is about 3 ghz for a 50\$ cpu.
That is what I have been saying. They are taking so long to release this that by the time they do it will be a moot point.

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Not exactly moot, the poor devs who can't afford / make up a reason to buy a new 50\$ cpu (which most likely would also include a completely new set, expensive ddr3 ram and all) would then get the chance for great playback on their -current- computers.

Which is a nice goal in itself.

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Originally Posted by deanjo
NIST sums it up nicely, even at 128 bit

People 7.00E+09
Computers per person 10.00
Computers 1.00E+09
Combos per second per computer 7.00E+19
Total combos per second 7.00E+19
Seconds per year 3.15E+07
Total combos per year 2.22E+12
128-bit key combos (*50%) 1.70E+38
Years to crack 7.66E+25
the IX the pro part of the (C't) has a artikle of password cracking WPA2! with the VGA's!
100 000 Valid checks per second! per (PC+vga's) unit!

(Combos per second per computer) = 100 000 !

with only a quatcore in 2 monds amd bring the 6 core! and this carts only 55nm! in 40nm VGAs you will have 150 000 Combos per second per computer.

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Originally Posted by Qaridarium
(Combos per second per computer) = 100 000 !.
For your information 100 000 combos per second is insignificant. We're talking about easily over 91292051633079798989750131910067116342455228306074 83146366674788070551428931526296681935903540008509 26342401 total amount.

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Also another note: the thing about WPA2 is that passwords are weak. If the passwords weren't that weak, WPA2 wouldn't be breakable in a timely manner. WPA2 in itself is not weak, humans are. You're not breaking the AES key there, you are just breaking a password set by a silly human. Key-based authentication would be closer to unbreakable.
Last edited by nanonyme; 04-22-2009 at 07:54 PM.