"I've disabled my root accounts on the fd.o machines. I don't trust me with them anymore either." (c)
at least that is good thinking on his part or otherwise he would be eaten alive. maaan, it's a bad news, especially after Novell being dismembered by shady buyers and not bought by Vmware. we really lacking open graphic stack devs. i hope that RH will not screw him and he will stop drinking shit and take some good long sleep. several times. and be back in business, if not as maintaner but as dev, at least.
damn, trust is your main measure of authority in community. it's bad to fuck it up.



Reply With Quote
If you known the sha1 of a given commit you can check the entire history from that point back to day zero (since the IDs of the parents contribute to the hash of the commit); this basically ensure the integrity of the repository (short of a preimage attack on sha1). However this case wasn't an attempt to modify an existing commit, rather it was a "legit" commit (though on separate branch) that was only spotted by a human. Now, the message was clearly suspicious but through direct access to the repo you could sneak in a commit that looks plausible (e.g. maybe coming from another trusted developer) but contains malicious code; sure git push will warn you but you might overlook that change (for example when pulling stuff at work I don't inspect closely commits coming from trusted colleagues - though I do review stuff from interns or students).
But why would anyone possibly do that?
