Clang Picks Up Support For Per-Function Speculative Load Hardening (Spectre V1)

[phoronix]

Phoronix: Clang Picks Up Support For Per-Function Speculative Load Hardening (Spectre V1)

For several months now the mainline LLVM Clang compiler code has offered Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) for the compiler-based approach for Spectre Variant One protection for critical software that might not be mitigated by hand against Spectre V1 vulnerabilities that can be picked up by Smatch and other utilities. The Clang compiler now has support for SLH on a function-by-function basis...

http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=Clang-Per-Function-SLH-Spectre

[cl333r]

I don't know about you folks, but I'm sick and tired of mentions of Spectre & Friends. Maybe because I don't work in a security critical environment.

[onicsis]

I don't know about you folks, but I'm sick and tired of mentions of Spectre & Friends. Maybe because I don't work in a security critical environment.

You can add also ECCPloit exploiting DRAM weakness, by bypassing error-correcting code of DDR3 memory modules.